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Chapter 2
Default person versus default number in
agreement
Peter Ackema
University of Edinburgh
Ad Neeleman
UCL
In this paper, we compare the behaviour of the default in the person system (third
person) with the default in the number system (singular). We argue, following
Nevins (2007; 2011), that third person pronouns have person features, while singu-
lar DPs lack number features. The evidence for these claims comes from situations
in which a single head agrees with multiple DPs that have contrasting person and
number specifications. In cases where the number of morphological slots in which
agreement can be realized is lower than the number of agreement relations estab-
lished in syntax, such contrasting specification may prove problematic. As it turns
out, conflicts between singular and plural do not result in ungrammaticality, but
conflicts between third person and first or second person do. Such person clashes
can be avoided if the morphological realization of the relevant person features is
syncretic. Alternatively, languages may make use of a person hierarchy that reg-
ulates the morphological realization of conflicting specifications for person. The
argument we present is rooted in, and supports, the theory of person developed in
Ackema & Neeleman (2013; 2018).
1 Introduction
The problem addressed in this paper is an apparent paradox involving singular
number and third person. On the one hand, there is evidence that in the per-
son system the default is third person, while in the number system the default
is singular. For example, dummy pronouns and verbs that fail to agree (as in
impersonal passives) show up in the third person singular:
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(1) a. It seems that a solution is hard to find.
b. * I/you/they seem(s) that a solution is hard to find.
(2) Dutch
Nog
still
jaren
years
is
be-3sg
/
/
*ben
be.1sg
/
/
*bent
be.2sg
/
/
*zijn
be.pl
naar
for
een
a
oplossing
solution
gezocht.
searched
‘People searched for a solution for many years.’
On the other hand, singular agreement can be overwritten by plural agreement
in certain contexts, but in those same contexts third person agreement cannot be
overwritten. For example, in (3) the expected singular agreement with the subject
pronoun is replaced by plural agreement if the clefted constituent is plural, but
not by first person or second person agreement if the clefted constituent is a first
person or second person pronoun.
(3) Dutch
a. pl overwrites sg
Het
it
zijn
are.pl
zij
they
die
who
de
the
whisky
whisky
gestolen
stolen
hebben.
have
‘It’s them who stole the whisky.’
b. 1st clashes with 3rd
* Het
it
ben
am
ik
I
die
who
de
the
whisky
whisky
gestolen
stolen
heeft.
has
‘It’s me who stole the whisky.’
c. 2nd clashes with 3rd
* Het
it
ben
are.sg
jij
you.sg
die
who
de
the
whisky
whisky
gestolen
stolen
heeft.
has
‘It’s you who stole the whisky.’
d. No overwriting
Het
it
is
is
hij
he
die
who
de
the
whisky
whisky
gestolen
stolen
heeft.
has
‘It’s him who stole the whisky.’
Nevins (2007; 2011) argues that singular is the absence of plural, while third
person is not the absence of person but does in fact have a feature specification
(see also Kerstens 1993; Halle 1997; contra Forchheimer 1953; Kayne 1993; Harley
& Ritter 2002; Béjar & Rezac 2003; Cysouw 2003; Anagnostopoulou 2005; Adger
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& Harbour 2007). We agree with this (see Ackema & Neeleman 2013; 2018). But
if there is this asymmetry between singular number and third person, the ques-
tion arises how can we account for the fact that both singular and third person
are defaults. This would follow naturally from the idea, rejected here, that third
person, like singular, is a name for the absence of information.
In this paper, we will account for the fact that the default in the person system
has feature content while the default in the number system does not. We will
show that our proposal captures data from various languages that involve the
realization of a single agreement slot when there is agreement with multiple
arguments, as in the examples in (3). The paper is organized as follows. In §2,
we introduce a system of privative person features, in which third person has
a specification. In §3, we introduce a system of privative number features, in
which singular has no specification. We set out our theory of defaults in §4. We
will argue that the default is that feature specification that allows reference to
the empty set. In §5 and §6, we confront this theory with data in which multiple
arguments agree with a single verbal head. §7 concludes the chapter.
2 The person system
Our starting point in exploring the person system is a generalization about the
pattern of syncretisms found in the morphological realization of person.The rele-
vant generalizationwas noted by Baerman et al. (2005: 59) and Baerman&Brown
(2011) and is given in (4)
(4) 1–2 and 2–3 syncretisms are far more common than 1–3 syncretisms.
The asymmetry expressed in (4) suggests that the system of person features is
organised as in (5) (compare Kerstens 1993; Halle 1997; Bennis & MacLean 2006;
Aalberse & Don 2009; 2011):
(5) First person Second person Third person
[F1] [F1 F2] [F2]
In line with this, we propose in Ackema & Neeleman (2013) that there are two
person features, prox and dist. Prox is shared by first and second person; dist
is shared by second and third person. Following insights in Harbour (2016), we
interpret these features as functions. Both operate on an input set to deliver a
subset as output.
The basic input set for the person system, which we call Si+u+o, contains a
subset Si+u, which in turn contains a subset Si. Si contains the speaker, which
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we will represent as i, and any associates of the speaker, represented as ai. Si+u
additionally contains the addressee(s), represented as u, and any associates of
the addressee (au). Finally, Si+u+o contains additional members that are neither
associates of the speaker nor of the addressee(s); these other members are repre-
sented as o.1 The only obligatory members of Si+u+o are one i and one u:
(6) a. i (ai) u (au) (o)
S𝑖
S𝑖+𝑢
S𝑖+𝑢+𝑜
b. pred(Si+u+o) = Si+u
c. pred(Si+u) = Si
d. prox(S) = pred(S)
e. dist(S) = S – pred(S)
The two person features are defined in terms of a function pred (for ‘predeces-
sor’) given in (6b,c). Prox, whose definition is given in (6d), discards the outer
layer of the input set; applied to Si+u+o it delivers Si+u. Dist, whose definition is
given in (6e), selects the outer layer; applied to Si+u+o it delivers Si+u+o − Si+u.
We now consider how first, second and third person readings are derived, start-
ing with the singular. The specification of the third person singular is straight-
forward: it should be [dist], as this feature will give Si+u+o − Si+u, a set that
excludes the speaker and any addressees.
The first person singular is derived by two applications of prox. It first applies
to Si+u+o, delivering Si+u; it then applies to the latter set, delivering Si. The only
obligatory member of Si is the speaker, yielding the correct interpretation in the
singular:
(7) prox(prox(Si+u+o))
= prox(Si+u) by (6d)
= Si by (6d)
1For the purposes of this paper, the difference between associates and others is irrelevant. A
detailed discussion of this distinction can be found in Ackema & Neeleman (2018).
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The second person singular is generated by applying both prox and dist. Prox
is applied first, so that Si+u is selected. Applying dist to this set removes Si,
leaving a set with u as the only obligatory member:
(8) dist(prox(Si+u+o))
= dist(Si+u) by (6d)
= Si+u − Si by (6e)
= Su
Note that the opposite order of function application (first dist, then prox) is
not coherent. Dist applied to Si+u+o yields Si+u+o − Si+u. But as this set is not
layered, prox cannot apply to it.
We assume that the ‘person space’ in (6a) is introduced by a node we refer to
as NΠ. Person features are introduced in a prs node that selects NΠ. The basic
semantics of this node is the identity function λP.P, but this specification can be
enriched through function composition if prox and/or dist are added. The or-
der of function application is reflected in syntax. The notation we use for this is
borrowed from feature geometry (Gazdar & Pullum 1982; Harley & Ritter 2002):
features representing functions applied later are dominated by features repre-
senting functions applied earlier:
(9) Singular
a. 1st person
nmb
nmb prs
prs
prox
prox
nΠ
b. 2nd person
nmb
nmb prs
prs
prox
dist
nΠ
c. 3rd person
nmb
nmb prs
prs
dist
nΠ
We now turn to plural pronouns. For now, we assume that number is encoded
through an nmb node, which is merged above prs and which can host a feature
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pl (but see §3). If this feature is present, the cardinality of the output set of the
person system must be larger than one.
In the second and third person, the person specification in the plural is the
same as the person specification in the singular. In the first person, however,
there are two options. Suppose that the plural feature is simply added to the
singular form in (9a), where prox is applied twice. This delivers Si, a set contain-
ing the speaker and in the plural also any contextually given associates, but no
addressee. The result is an exclusive first person pronoun. Another option is to
apply prox only once.This delivers Si+u, a set containing the speaker, at least one
addressee, and any associates. The resulting pronoun is a first person inclusive:
(10) Plural
a. 1st person inclusive
nmb
nmb
pl
prs
prs
prox
nΠ
b. 1st person exclusive
nmb
nmb
pl
prs
prs
prox
prox
nΠ
c. 2nd person
nmb
nmb
pl
prs
prs
prox
dist
nΠ
d. 3rd person
nmb
nmb
pl
prs
prs
dist
nΠ
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Note that the option of applying prox only once in the first person is incom-
patible with a singular reading. Such a derivation has as its output Si+u, a set
with two obligatory members.
The system just outlined exhausts the feature structures made available by the
person system. No structures other than those in (9) and (10) deliver an inter-
pretable output. Consider why. Both prox and dist require a layered input set.
Given that Si+u+o has only three layers, the number of possible feature combina-
tions is restricted. If dist is applied first, this delivers an unstructured set (Si+u+o
− Si+u), and hence neither prox nor dist can apply subsequently. If prox is ap-
plied first, the output is a layered set (Si+u). This leaves open three possibilities:
(i) prox applies again, which yields an unstructured set (Si)), or (ii) dist applies,
which again yields an unstructured set (Si+u − Si), or (iii) neither prox nor dist
applies, which delivers the first person inclusive.
As a result, the following generalizations about person distinctions expressed
in pronouns follow (adapted from Bobaljik 2008):
(11) a. No language distinguishes pronouns expressing i+i and i+ai.
b. No language distinguishes pronouns expressing u+u and u+au.
c. No language distinguishes pronouns expressing i+i+u, i+u+u and
i+u+ai/u.
In the system just outlined, the first person (inclusive or exclusive) does not
form a natural class with the third person to the exclusion of the second person.
Similarly, the first person inclusive does not form a natural class with the second
person to the exclusion of the first person exclusive. This is relevant in view of
the results of a large-scale study reported in Harbour (2016). Harbour looked at
which systematic patterns of syncretism are attested cross-linguistically, where
a systematic pattern of syncretism is a syncretism characteristic of all paradigms
of a given language. He found that no language had a systematic syncretism for
first and third person, or for first person inclusive and second person. On the as-
sumption that the distribution of systematic syncretisms reflects the underlying
distribution of features, this shows that no set of features is shared uniquely by
the relevant combinations of persons.
The absence of systematic syncretisms for first person inclusive and second
person is in line with a typological generalization discussed by Zwicky (1977).
Zwicky argues that in languages that lack the distinction between inclusive and
exclusive first person pronouns, the inclusive reading is systematically expressed
by the first person, rather than the second person plural pronoun – this despite
the fact that the inclusive reading covers both speaker and addressee. An account
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for this observation would be impossible if first person inclusive and the second
person did form a natural class to the exclusion of the first person exclusive.2
For the purposes of this paper, the main characteristic of our person system is
that third person has a person specification, namely [dist]. We should note that
this does not mean that there are no pronouns that lack person features. One
would expect there to be such pronouns, especially in an analysis based on pri-
vative features. In Ackema & Neeleman (2018), we argue that a particular type
of generic pronoun should be analyzed in this way (see also Egerland 2003 and
D’Alessandro 2007). English one, West Frisianmen (Hoekstra 2010) and Icelandic
maður (Sigurðsson & Egerland 2009) are examples: in the absence of person fea-
tures, the generic operator contained in them ranges over the entire person space
(Si+u+o).
(12) Generic one
gen prs
prs nΠ
3 The number system
We now turn to the number system.We will argue that, like the person system, it
is based on privative features that are interpreted as functions. We will show that
in this system there cannot be a feature that encodes singularity. Rather, singular
is one of the interpretations that results from the absence of a number feature
specification.
2Strictly speaking, in order to capture Zwicky’s generalization, not only the syntactic feature
system, but also the system of morphological realization (spell out) must be considered. In fact,
there is a way of constructing grammars that violate the generalization in our system, namely
by impoverishment of dist in in the context of both pl and prox (so in the second person
plural). In a language that has distinct spell-out rules that apply to the feature structures [prox]
and [prox–prox], this will create a formal opposition between first person exclusive on the
one hand, and first person inclusive and second person on the other. Interestingly, Sanuma
appears to have a pronominal spell-out system of this type (see Borgman 1990: 149 and Simon
2005: 127; see Perri Ferreira 2013 for critical discussion of Borgman’s observations). However,
in the absence of the particular set of circumstances described above, we expect Zwicky’s
generalization to hold, and we therefore expect it to be valid at least as a statistical universal.
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In languages that make a distinction between inclusive and exclusive first per-
son pronouns, two types of number system are found. The difference between
these systems involves the interpretation of number in the inclusive. In what we
will call absolute number systems, the inclusive is always marked as either dual
or plural. Maori provides an example (Table 1; Maori paradigm from Cysouw
2003: 91).
Table 1: Maori pronouns
Singular [ ] Plural [pl] Dual [pl min]
1 inclusive - tā-ua tā-tou
1 exclusive au ā-ua mā-tou
2 koe kōr-ua kou-tou
3 ia rā-ua rā-tou
As indicated, absolute number systems can in principle be analyzed using two
features, pl (for ‘plural’) and min (for ‘minimal’), which we take to be hosted by a
dedicated functional head nmb. Pl encodes that the cardinality of the set referred
to, which we will represent as 𝑛, exceeds 1 (𝑛 > 1). min selects the minimal plural
(𝑛 = 2).
There is a second type of number system, which we will refer to as a relative
number system. In such a system, the interpretation of number marking seems
dependent on person, with a shift in the inclusive that is absent in the other
persons. In particular, the inclusive pronoun need not be inflected for number.
If it is, its cardinality is larger than two, whereas in other pronouns, number
marking implies a cardinality larger than one. The Rembarrnga paradigm (see
Cysouw 2003: 233) in Table 2 illustrates the point.
Table 2: Rembarrnga pronouns
Singular Plural Dual Trial
1 inclusive - yukku ngakorru ngakorr-bbarrah
1 exclusive ngunu yarru yarr-bbarrah
2 ku nakorru nakorr-bbarrah
3 nawu/ngadu barru barr-bbarrah
Such number systems are typically analyzed using the min feature already
mentioned and – instead of pl – a feature aug for ‘augmented’ (see Bobaljik
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2008 and Cysouw 2011, and references mentioned there). Aug indicates that n is
larger than the minimal cardinality allowed by the person system. Except in the
inclusive, the minimal cardinality allowed by the person system is one, and so
aug delivers 𝑛 > 1. In the inclusive, however, the minimal cardinality allowed by
the person system is two, so aug delivers 𝑛 > 2. On this analysis, the Rembarrnga
paradigm looks much more elegant (Table 3).
Table 3: Rembarrnga pronouns
Non-aug. [ ] Augmented [aug] Unit-augmented [aug min]
1 inclusive yukku ngakorru ngakorr-bbarrah
1 exclusive ngunu yarru yarr-bbarrah
2 ku nakorru nakorr-bbarrah
3 nawu/ngadu barru barr-bbarrah
If wewere to accept both the feature systems in Table 1 and 3, the resulting pro-
posal would model parametric variation between absolute and relative number
systems as a choice between features (pl versus aug). However, this would make
the parametrization of the number system something of an oddity. Our impres-
sion is that in other cases where feature systems are parametrized, languages
select more or fewer features from a fixed inventory, rather than choosing be-
tween features that cannot co-occur in the same grammar. We propose to fix
this problem by assuming that aug is universal and that pl does not exist. How-
ever, the effects of aug are dependent on information from the person system.
If aug has no access to the person system, then its interpretation defaults to the
interpretation normally assumed for pl. This idea can be worked out as follows.
The input set for the number system is ℕ. The features aug and min select a
subset fromℕ in accordance with the definitions in (13a,b).The cardinality of the
set delivered by the person system must be an element of this subset.
(13) a. aug(S) = S’, S’ ⊆ S, n ∈ S’ ⇔ n > nR
b. min(S) = S’, S’ ⊆ S, n ∈ S’ ⇔ n > 0 ∧ ∄n’, n’ ∈ S ∧ n’ < n
As indicated in (13a), aug refers to a reference number nR, whose value is de-
termined by the following procedure (Sperson is the output of the person system):
(14) a. nR = nperson iff nperson is accessible and nperson > 0; otherwise nR = 1
b. 𝑛person = ||strip (Sperson)||
c. strip (Sperson) = 𝑆’, 𝑆’ ⊆ Sperson, 𝑝 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑢} ⇔ 𝑝 ∈ 𝑆’
30
2 Default person versus default number in agreement
The accessibility of person information depends on the functional structure
of the pronoun. We assume, following Platzack (1983) and others, that there is
parametric variation in whether certain functional heads project separately or
conflate and project together. Applied to nmb and prs, this gives the possible
structures for pronouns in (15).
(15) a. nmb
nmb prs
prs nΠ
b. nmb/prs
nmb/prs nΠ
Our hypothesis is that nperson is accessible to aug if and only if nmb and prs
conflate, so that aug is located in the same node as the person features that de-
liver Sperson. Given the definitions in (14), this means that only in (15b) can nR
assume a value other than 1.
Consider how this plays out in absolute and relative number systems, respec-
tively. The situation in absolute number systems is straightforward, as nR is al-
ways 1 (by default, as aug has no access to person information):
(16) Absolute number system – (15a)
• nR = 1 (by default)
• nmb–aug: 𝑛 > 1
• nmb–aug–min: 𝑛 = 2
In relative number systems, aug does have access to the person system, which
means that nR varies depending on person, along the following lines:
(17) Relative number system – (15b)
a. First person inclusive:
• 𝑛person = ||strip ({𝑖, 𝑎𝑖+, 𝑢, 𝑎𝑢+}) || = || {𝑖, 𝑢} || = 2
• 𝑛R = 𝑛person = 2
• nmb–aug: 𝑛 > 2
• nmb–aug–min: 𝑛 = 3
b. First person exclusive:
• 𝑛person = ||strip ({𝑖, 𝑎𝑖+}) || = ||{𝑖}|| = 1
• 𝑛R = 𝑛person = 1
• nmb–aug: 𝑛 > 1
• nmb–aug–min: 𝑛 = 2
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c. Second person:
• 𝑛person = ||strip ({𝑢, 𝑎𝑢+}) || = || {𝑢} || = 1
• 𝑛R = 𝑛person = 1
• nmb–aug: 𝑛 > 1
• nmb–aug–min: 𝑛 = 2
d. Third person:
• 𝑛person = ||strip ({𝑜+}) || = ||{ }|| = 0
• 𝑛R = 1 (by default)
• nmb–aug: 𝑛 > 1
• nmb–aug–min: 𝑛 = 2
When the semantics of number in (15b) is computed, the value of nperson is
accessible to aug, because prs is part of the same terminal node.This has an effect
for the interpretation of number in the first person inclusive. Since applying prox
once delivers a set with i and u as obligatory members (see (10a)), nR = nperson
= 2 here. The consequence is that aug requires that 𝑛 > 2. When the semantics
of the terminal containing aug in the structures in (15a) is computed, however,
the value of nperson is not accessible, because [prs–prox] is generated in a sister
node. This means that nR assumes its default value of 1, also in the first person
inclusive, so that aug now requires that 𝑛 > 1.
Our analysis makes a crucial prediction about the morphological form of pro-
nominal number. In absolute systems, plural can be either agglutinative or fu-
sional. If the terminals introducing person and number are spelled out separately,
an agglutinative number paradigmwill emerge; if spell-out targets a string of ter-
minals or a non-terminal node (on a par with {go past} ⇔ went), the number
morphology will be fused with the person morphology. If person and number
are introduced in the same terminal, however, as is the case in relative systems,
theymust be fusional (there is no position in which a distinct number morpheme
could be anchored).3 We predict, then, that if number marking is agglutinative
in pronouns, the number system must be of the absolute type. This prediction
appears to be confirmed by the discussion in Cysouw (2003: 89, 263), where it is
noted that languages that have a relative number system and are agglutinative
for aug are extremely rare, if they exist at all (see also Greenberg 1988).
Note that it is possible for a relative number system to be agglutinating for
min, as min need not have access to person information, but only to the output
3This is under the assumption that an operation like fission, as used in Distributed Morphology
(see Halle & Marantz 1993 and Noyer 1997), either does not exist or must give rise to instances
of multiple exponence, which is not at issue here.
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of aug. Hence, a language can have an interpretable structure in which nmb and
prs are partially conflated, as in (18).
(18) nmb
nmb
min
nmb/prs
nmb/prs
aug
nΠ
Languages with a relative number system that have agglutinative morphology
for min indeed exist; the Rembarrnga paradigm in Table 3 provides an example.
In sum, the aug feature is shared by all number systems, but its interpretive
effects depend on whether or not it has access to information delivered by the
person features, which in turn depends on the syntactic structure of pronouns.
Notice that in this system singular and non-augmented must both equal the ab-
sence of aug. There cannot be a contentful privative feature that characterizes
singular and non-augmented number, given that the interpretation of these num-
bers as n=1 or n=2 is determined fully by the interpretation of aug.Therefore, the
default in the number system is characterized by the absence of a feature speci-
fication.
4 Defaults
If we are correct in assuming that singular is a non-number, while third person
has a feature specification, the question arises why both are defaults. In order to
address this question, we must first consider what a default is. There are several
views of this; the following three are probably the most common.
(i) Defaults are the most frequent forms. It is not clear what insight that can
provide here.
(ii) Defaults correspond to absence of features. This is an attractive idea, but it
cannot work on our view of person, as the third person has feature content.
(iii) Defaults correspond to feature structures that do not force an interpreta-
tion. This is the view we will defend.
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Our core assumption is that only if a 𝜑-feature structure may denote an empty
set can it fail to be interpreted, and hence act as default. In the person system,
[dist] is the only feature structure that can deliver an empty set. Dist selects
the outer layer in (6), discarding the only obligatory members of Si+u+o, speaker
and addressee. As o is optional, [dist] may deliver an empty set. All other speci-
fications deliver a set that contains either i or u or both and can therefore not act
as a default. This holds, even, for a specification in which prs does not contain
person features, as this delivers a generic impersonal pronoun that ranges over
the entire Si+u+o input set, see (12).
In the number system, [ ] is the only feature structure that can deliver an
empty set. [aug] and [aug–min] impose a positive cardinality on the output of
the person system. However, [ ] does not, and is therefore compatible with a car-
dinality of 0 in both absolute and relative number systems, regardless of person
specification.
5 Multiple agreement, single spell-out
We have argued that third person has a feature specification, as opposed to sin-
gular number, and explained why nevertheless both can function as defaults. We
now show how the asymmetry in feature specification plays out in agreement.
Nevins (2011) discusses so-called omnivorous number systems, in which a verb
shows plural agreement when either subject or object is plural (see 19)).
(19) Eastern Abruzzese (D’Alessandro & Roberts 2010)
a. Giuwanne
John
a
has
pittate
painted.sg
nu
a
mure.
wall
b. Giuwanne
John
e
and
Mmarije
Mary
a
have
pittite
painted.pl
nu
a
mure.
wall
c. Giuwanne
John
a
has
pittite
painted.pl
ddu
two
mure.
walls
d. Giuwanne
John
e
and
Mmarije
Mary
a
have
pittite
painted.pl
ddu
two
mure.
walls
Like Nevins, we assume that data like (19) involve multiple agreement. We
further assume that this leads to a situation in which one morpho-phonological
agreement slot must realize two distinct feature bundles:
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(20) a. DP1 … V-𝜑1-𝜑2 … DP2
b. V-𝜑1-𝜑2 ⇔ /V/-/affix/
In general, where one form realizes two feature bundles either unification is
necessary or arbitration by rules of resolution. We begin by discussing unifica-
tion. In the next section, we will discuss resolution rules.
We assume that unification is either unification of sets of syntactic feature
structures or of phonological forms. The syntactic unifications relevant to the
data in (19) are given below. These can all be realized without difficulty, as a
singular form in (21a) and a plural form in (21b-d):
(21) a. V-[ ]1-[ ]2 → V-[ ]1+2
b. V-[aug]1-[ ]2 → V-[aug]1+2
c. V-[ ]1-[aug]2 → V-[aug]1+2
d. V-[aug]1-[aug]2 → V-[aug]1+2
Given that third person is different from singular in that it does have feature
content, syntactic unification in parallel cases involving person can result in fea-
ture bundles with multiple person specifications:
(22) a. V-[dist]1-[dist]2 → V-[dist]1+2
b. V-[dist]1-[prox (…)]2 → V-[dist prox (…)]1+2
While realization of the output in (22a) is unproblematic, the feature specifi-
cation in (22b) makes spell-out impossible, on the assumption that the process is
blocked if a single agreement slot contains multiple feature bundles for the same
class of 𝜑-features.4 This means that where the input contains conflicting per-
son specifications, spell-out cannot proceed on the basis of syntactic unification.
Instead, phonological unification is necessary. Hence the structure in (22b) can
be realized only if the spell-out rules for [dist] and [prox (…)] deliver the same
phonological form:
(23) a. {dist} ⇔ /aaa/
b. {prox(…)} ⇔ /aaa/
c. V-[dist]1-[prox (…)]2 ⇔ /V/-/aaa/
4Note that there is a fundamental difference between the feature specification [dist prox] in
(22b) on the one hand and the feature specification [prox–dist] (second person) on the other.
The former contains two (simplex) feature bundles (for third and first person), with the result
that spell-out is blocked.
35
Peter Ackema & Ad Neeleman
There are other situations in which a derivation converges if a single phono-
logical element can realize multiple conflicting syntactic feature bundles; an ex-
ample involves case morphology on free relatives in German, see Groos & van
Riemsdijk (1981).
We will now discuss instances of (22) and (23). In particular, we will consider
two structures in which a low DP must have the same person specification as
imposed on the verb by the subject in a double agreement structure.5 One is the
Dutch cleft construction already introduced in (3). The other involves the well-
known case of nominative objects in Icelandic. Let us start with the latter.
Agreement with nominative objects in Icelandic is possible when the subject
carries quirky case. However, such agreement is usually impossible with first or
second person objects:6
(24) Icelandic (Sigurðsson & Holmberg 2008)
a. * Honum
him.dat
líkum
like-1pl
við.
we.nom
‘He likes us.’
b. * Honum
him.dat
líkið
like-2pl
þið.
you.pl.nom
‘He likes you all.’
c. Honum
him.dat
líka
like-3pl
þeir.
they.nom
‘He likes them.’
We follow a strand in the literature according to which the verb agrees with
both the quirky subject and the nominative object (see Burzio 2000, Schütze 2003,
and Ussery 2013). Thus, Icelandic agreement is regulated by two rules: (i) agree
5In contrast, there are no similar cases in which a low DP must have the same number spec-
ification as the subject. This follows from the hypothesis that singular is absence of number
features. Nevins (2011) proposes an analysis of relevant person-number contrasts along similar
lines. His account assumes that the person system is built on bivalent features, while features
in the number system are privative, with singular lacking number. The above preserves the
insights of Nevins’ proposal while avoiding this duality of design. Both the person system and
the number system have privative features, and there is a principled reason why singular is
featureless while third person has content.
6D’Alessandro (2007) shows that impersonal si constructions in Italian behave in a fashion par-
allel to the Icelandic examples discussed below: si triggers default third person singular agree-
ment, and when the object is nominative the verb agrees in number with it. Crucially, in the
latter case the object cannot be first or second person. Any adequate analysis proposed for
Icelandic can therefore be extended to Italian impersonal constructions, as indeed argued by
D’Alessandro.
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with the subject; (ii) agree with nominatives. Non-nominative DPs trigger default
third person singular agreement, presumably because they differ from nomina-
tives in having a Case shell which prevents access to their 𝜑-features. Therefore,
quirky subjects behave just like other categories that lack 𝜑-features, such as
clausal subjects. Indeed, in examples with a quirky subject in which the object is
not nominative, the verb must carry third person singular inflection:
(25) (Schütze 2003)
Mig
me.acc
hefur
has-3sg
/
/
*hef
*1sg
/
/
*hafa
*3pl
vantað
lacked
mýts.
mice.acc
‘I have lacked mice.’
Structures like those in (24), which involve agreement with both a quirky sub-
ject and a nominative object, will then have a verb that carries two distinct 𝜑-
feature bundles, one of which will be [dist] (KP stands for ‘Case Phrase’, in this
structure the quirky subject):
(26) KP1 … V-[dist]1-𝜑2 … DP2
Whether or not (26) can be realized depends on the content of 𝜑2. Consider
the various possibilities listed in (27).
(27) a. KP1 … V-[dist]1-[dist]2 … DP2
b. KP1 … V-[dist]1-[dist aug]2 … DP2
c. KP1 … V-[dist]1-[prox (…)]2 … DP2
Syntactic unification of feature bundles applied to these structures yields the
following:
(28) a. KP1 … V-[dist]1+2 … DP2
b. KP1 … V-[dist aug]1+2 … DP2
c. KP1 … V-[dist prox (…)]1+2 … DP2
The feature bundles in (28a) and (28b) are unproblematic as far as spell-out is
concerned. The feature bundle in (28c) is not, however, as it contains contradic-
tory values for person.This means that spell-out must proceed on the basis of the
non-unified structure in (27c). But that will only meet the condition that there be
a single affix if phonological unification is possible, which is only the case if the
phonological realization of [dist]1 is identical to the phonological realization of
[prox (…)]2.
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Indeed, Sigurðsson (1996) observes that the person restriction on object agree-
ment is lifted (for many speakers) when the first/second person form of the verb
is syncretic with the third person form:7
(29) a. bored.at-3sg ⇔ /leiddist/ (Sigurðsson 1996)
b. * Henni
her.dat
leiddumst
bored.at-1pl
við.
we.nom
c. % Henni
her.dat
leiddust
bored.at-2pl
þið.
you-pl.nom
d. ? Henni
her.dat
leiddist
bored.at-1sg
ég.
I.nom
e. ? Henni
her.dat
leiddist
bored.at-2sg
þú.
you-sg.nom
Agreement with lower nominative DPs does not only occur in mono-clausal,
but also in bi-clausal structures with a raising verb. In such structures, the same
person restriction is observed as in mono-clausal structures (see (30)).
(30) a. (Sigurðsson & Holmberg 2008)
* Honum
him.dat
mundum
would.1pl
virðast
seem
við
we.nom
(vera)
(be)
hæfir.
competent
b. * Honum
him.dat
munduð
would.2pl
virðast
seem
þið
you.pl.nom
(vera)
(be)
hæfir.
competent
c. Honum
him.dat
mundu
would.3pl
virðast
seem
þeir
they.nom
(vera)
(be)
hæfir.
competent
‘They would seem to be competent to him.’
Interestingly, many speakers allow suspension of agreement with the nomina-
tive in the bi-clausal construction. Crucially, the person restriction disappears in
7Note that the fact that syncretism prevents the problem with conflicting person features indi-
cates that the solution should not be sought in syntax proper. This rules out a number of ac-
counts that attempt to deal with such data in terms of an intervention effect, such as Sigurðsson
& Holmberg 2008. While the relevant syncretism in Icelandic is a relatively rare phenomenon,
we will see below that in a similar situation in Dutch clefts, syncretism indeed systematically
ameliorates person clashes. An analysis should therefore not centre on a putative problem
with syntactically establishing the agreement relation(s) in question, but on a problem with
how these relations are expressed on the verb.
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that case (see (31)). This is as expected: if there is only agreement with the quirky
subject, there cannot be conflicting feature bundles in the verb.
(31) (Sigurðsson & Holmberg 2008)
a. Honum
him.dat
mundi
would.3sg
virðast
seem
við
we.nom
(vera)
(be)
hæfir.
competent
b. Honum
him.dat
mundi
would.3sg
virðast
seem
þið
you.pl.nom
(vera)
(be)
hæfir.
competent
c. Honum
him.dat
mundi
would.3sg
virðast
seem
þeir
they.nom
(vera)
(be)
hæfir.
competent
Sigurðsson & Holmberg (2008) observe that there is considerable variation
in whether suspension of agreement is allowed, preferred or required. In one
variant (their Icelandic C), agreement with low nominatives is dispreferred in
general, even inmono-clausal constructions.We predict that in that variant there
should not be a person restriction on nominative objects at all. This appears to
be in line with Sigurðsson and Holmberg’s assessment of the relevant data.
Dutch clefts show almost the same pattern of core observations as Icelandic
quirky subject constructions (see also den Dikken 2014). They have the following
properties.
(i) Number agreement with a clefted nominative is obligatory (see (32)).
(ii) If there is unambiguous person agreement, first and second person nomi-
natives cannot be clefted (see (33)).
(iii) Some speakers allow suspension of person agreement with clefted nomi-
natives. In that case, there is no person restriction (hence the %-sign on
the variants with third singular is in (33a,b)).
(iv) Where the verb forms triggered by the pronoun in subject position (het
‘it’) and by the clefted nominative DP are identical, the person restriction
is lifted for all speakers. This is the case with some modal verbs and in the
past tense (see (34)).
(32) Dutch
Het
it
zijn
are.pl
/
/
*is
is
zij
they
die
that
de
the
whisky
whisky
gestolen
stolen
hebben.
have
‘It’s them who stole the whisky.’
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(33) a. Het
it
%is
is
/
/
*ben
am
ik
I
die
that
de
the
whisky
whisky
gestolen
stolen
heeft.
has
‘It’s me who stole the whisky.’
b. Het
it
%is
is
/
/
*ben(t)
are.sg
jij
you.sg
die
that
de
the
whisky
whisky
gestolen
stolen
heeft.
has
‘It’s you who stole the whisky.’
c. Het
it
is
is
hij
he
die
that
de
the
whisky
whisky
gestolen
stolen
heeft.
has
‘It’s him who stole the whisky.’
(34) a. Het
it
zal
will
ik
I
/
/
jij
you.sg
wel
indeed
geweest
been
zijn
be
die
who
de
the
whisky
whisky
gestolen
stolen
heeft.
has
‘It is likely that it was me/you who stole the whisky.’
b. Het
it
was
was
ik
I
/
/
jij
you.sg
die
who
de
the
whisky
whisky
gestolen
stolen
heeft.
has
‘It was me/you who stole the whisky.’
These data allow an analysis similar to that proposed for Icelandic. Dutch re-
quires agreement with the subject and (usually) agreement with nominatives. If
the clefted constituent is a nominative DP, this yields the following representa-
tion:
(35) het1 … V-[dist]1-𝜑2 … DP2 [CP (Op2) … t2 …]
This structure can be realized without problems if the syntactic unification of
[dist]1 and 𝜑2 delivers a feature bundle that does not contain multiple person
specifications (i.e. when 𝜑2 is [dist (aug)]). Where syntactic unification does not
lead to such a feature bundle, the derivation may converge under phonological
unification (i.e. when /[dist]1/ = /𝜑2/). If neither type of unification allows spell-
out, the derivation crashes. This accounts for the person restriction observed in
(33). Some speakers allow agreementwith the clefted nominative to be suspended
under these circumstances (through deletion of 𝜑2). For those speakers, first and
40
2 Default person versus default number in agreement
second person singular clefted nominatives may show up with a third person
singular copula:8
(36) het1 … V-[dist]1 … DP2 [CP (Op2) … t2 …]
There is an interesting twist in the plural. Here, all speakers require number
agreement, but there are no effects of the person restriction:
(37) Het
it
zijn
are.pl
/
/
*is
is
wij
we
/
/
jullie
you.pl
die
that
de
the
whisky
whisky
gestolen
stolen
hebben.
have
‘It’s us/you who stole the whisky.’
These data have no parallel in Icelandic quirky subject constructions and can-
not be accounted for through phonological unification, since the third person
singular form of the copula is is and the first/second person plural form is zijn.
However, in contrast to Icelandic, Dutch shows full neutralization of person dis-
tinctions in the plural, as illustrated for the copula in (38). This fact can be ac-
counted for in terms of two rules of impoverishment that delete person features
in the context of aug, as in (39).
(38) a. Ik
I
ben
am
even
momentarily
weg.
away
‘I am out at the moment.’
b. Jij
you
bent
are
even
momentarily
weg.
away
8In Icelandic clefts, there is always full agreement between the copula and the clefted con-
stituent. In contrast to sentences with a quirky subject and nominative object, there is no
evidence for a person clash (Jóhannes Jónsson, Sigríður Sigurjónsdóttir and Höskuldur Þráins-
son, p.c.):
(i) Í gær
yesterday
varst
was.2sg
það
it
þú
you
sem
that
tókst
took.2sg
bókina.
book.def
‘Yesterday it was you who took the book.’
Apparently, then, Icelandic clefts also permit deletion of one of the 𝜑-feature bundles in the
verb before spell-out, but as opposed to the relevant variety of Dutch, it is the agreement with
the subject that is suppressed in Icelandic, rather than the agreement with the nominative
predicate.This gives rise to the question why the same deletion is not allowed in quirky subject
constructions. One possibility is that this is related to the fact that the agreement induced by
such a subject is default agreement. Arguably, default agreement cannot be deleted because it
is not recoverable, as opposed to regular agreement, which reflects features of the controller.
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c. Hij
He
is
is
even
momentarily
weg.
away
d. Wij/jullie/zij
we/you.pl/they
zijn
are
even
momentarily
weg.
away
(39) a. prox → ∅ / ___ [aug]
b. dist → ∅ / ___ [aug]
If the rules in (39) apply to the output of syntactic unification of the two fea-
ture bundles on the verb, they will remove the conflicting person specifications,
leaving only [aug], and therefore the structure will be realized with the plural
form of the copula. We give the derivation for a case with a clefted first person
plural pronoun in (40).9
(40) a. het1 … V-[dist]1-[prox aug]2 … DP2 [CP (Op2) … t2 …] (syntactic
output)
b. het1 … V-[dist prox aug]1+2 … DP2 [CP (Op2) … t2 …] (after
unification)
c. het1 … V-[aug]1+2 … DP2 [CP (Op2) … t2 …] (after application of (39))
In summary, third person agreement can induce a person clash in cases of
multiple agreement, while singular number agreement never induces a number
clash. This confirms that third person has a feature specification, while singular
number does not. However, not all cases ofmultiple agreement give rise to person
clashes. Sometimes, conflicts in person specification are resolved by rules that
operate before spell-out, which delete one of the problematic feature bundles. In
the next section, we will explore such rules of resolution.
6 Omnivorous person agreement
While we have seen that there is an asymmetry between person and number in
that person clashes in agreement exist, but number clashes do not, it is not the
case that multiple agreement for different persons necessarily leads to ungram-
maticality. Some languages allow resolution of a potential clash on the basis of a
9The person restriction discussed above for Dutch clefts is also absent when the pronoun used
as subject is not the weak pronoun het ‘it’ but the strong pronoun dat ‘that’. Arguably, this is
because the strong pronoun is a fronted (accusative) predicate, so that in this construction the
postverbal DP (the subject) is the only agreeing element; see Ackema & Neeleman (2018) for
discussion.
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person hierarchy: the feature structure highest on the hierarchy is realized, while
the feature structure lower on the hierarchy is not.
A good example is the agreement system in Ojibwe, which is sensitive to a
person hierarchy 2 > 1 > 3 (see Valentine 2001, among others). The agreement
morphology on the Ojibwe verb reflects features of both its subject and object.
That there must be simultaneous subject and object agreement is clearest when
considering the so-called theme sign on the verb. This is a suffix that expresses
the relative position of subject and object on the person hierarchy. In particular,
when the subject is higher on this hierarchy than the object, a ‘direct’ theme-
sign appears, while an ‘inverse’ form appears when the object is higher on the
hierarchy. The form of the theme sign is also determined by whether or not both
arguments are ‘local’ persons (first or second) or only one of them is. Thus, the
distribution in Table 4 of theme signs obtains (adapted from Lochbihler 2008).
Table 4: Ojibwe theme signs
Subject outranks object Object outranks subject
Both subject and object
are 1 or 2.
-i -in(i)
Either subject or object
is 3.
-aa -igw (and allomorphs)
This simultaneous sensitivity to the features of subject and object can only be
accounted for under the assumption that both agree with the verb. Only if the
features of both arguments are represented in the verb is it possible to have a
spell-out system for the verbal agreement that is based on a comparison of their
position on the person hierarchy. For the theme-sign suffixes, then, resolution
of person clashes is achieved by spell-out rules that insert a single morpheme as
the realization of pairs of feature bundles.
In addition to the theme-sign suffix, the Ojibwe verb also carries a prefix that
expresses person agreement. Interestingly, this prefix shows omnivorous person
effects: it expresses agreement with the argument that is highest on the person
hierarchy, regardless of whether this is the subject or the object (g- realizes sec-
ond person, n- first person, w-/∅- third person). Given the discussion above, we
know that the person features of both subject and object are represented in the
verb. Hence, the behavior of the Ojibwe prefix shows that resolution of a person
clash can also consist of non-realisation of the feature structure lower on the
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person hierarchy. The following examples illustrate the system (from Valentine
2001, cited here from Lochbihler 2008):
(41) Ojibwe
a. n-waabm-aa
1-see-dir
‘I see him.’
b. n-waabm-ig
1-see-inv
‘He sees me.’
(42) a. g-waabam-i
2-see-dir(local)
‘You see me.’
b. g-waabm-in
2-see-inv(local)
‘I see you.’
Not all languages that allow resolution of person clashes on the basis of a
hierarchy make use of the same hierarchy. There is one cross-linguistic constant,
though: third person is outranked by both first and second. The variation lies in
the ranking of first and second person, as follows:
(43) a. 2 > 1 > 3 (example: Ojibwe, see above)
b. 1 > 2 > 3 (example: Nocte, see below)
c. 1,2 > 3 (example: Kaqchikel, see below)
We suggest that this cross-linguistic variation comes about through variation
in weighting of the two conditions in (44). (For the purpose of (44b), a feature
structure is less uniform if it contains instances of more features.)
(44) a. prox outranks dist.
b. Less uniform feature structures outrank more uniform feature
structures.
A constraint equivalent to (44a) is present in some form or other in most any
theory of person hierarchies, sometimes expressed directly and sometimes ex-
pressed in the order of functional projections, or in the order of probing of fea-
tures (see below). The constraint in (44b) may look unfamiliar, but it is an instan-
tiation of the general idea that feature structures containing more features are
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marked compared to feature structures containing fewer. The only innovation is
that markedness is assumed not to increase with repetition of the same feature,
as in the first person exclusive (characterized by [prox–prox], see §2).
If the first condition in (44) is more important than the second, the resulting
hierarchy will be 1 > 2 > 3. This is because first person is maximally marked
according to this principle, as it contains only instances of prox. By contrast,
third person is maximally unmarked, as it contains only dist. Second person is
in between, as it contains both prox and dist. If the second condition in (44)
is more important, second person will be highest in the hierarchy, as this is the
only person with a non-uniform feature structure. The relative ranking of first
and third person is still determined by the first condition, so that the result is a
hierarchy 2 > 1 > 3. Finally, if the two conditions are equally weighted, a hierarchy
results in which first and second person are ranked equally, and are both ranked
above third person.
Nocte is an example of a language that is like Ojibwe, but with first and second
person reversed on the hierarchy (that is, it uses a 1 > 2 > 3 hierarchy). The fol-
lowing data (from DeLancey 1981: 641, cited here from Croft 2003: 172) illustrate
this:
(45) Nocte
a. Nga-ma
1sg-erg
ate
3sg
hetho-ang.
teach-1
‘I will teach him.’
b. Ate-ma
3sg-erg
nga-nang
1sg-acc
hetho-h-ang.
teach-inv-1
‘He will teach me.’
c. Nang-ma
2sg-erg
nga
1sg
hetho-h-ang.
teach-inv-1
‘You will teach me.’
d. Nga-ma
1sg-erg
nang
2sg
hetho-e.
teach-1pl
‘I will teach you.’
As in Ojibwe, an inversemarker appears on the verb in case the object is higher
on the person hierarchy than the subject, the only difference being that, since the
hierarchy is 1 > 2 > 3 in Nocte, the inverse marker is used when the subject is
second person and the object first person. As before, the presence of this kind
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of morphology can only be understood if there is double agreement, so that the
features of both subject and object are represented in the verb. Also as in Ojibwe,
there is a second morpheme, in this case a suffix, that agrees in person with that
argument whose feature specification is highest on the hierarchy (the omnivo-
rous person effect). There is an interesting twist when the subject is first person
and the object second person, as in (45d). As expected, the person agreement
shown by the relevant suffix is with first person. However, the number expressed
is an unexpected inclusive plural, rather than the singular. We will not attempt
to analyse this observation, but it is another indication that the agreement mor-
phology reflects agreement with both subject and object.
The final possibility of the system outlined above is a person hierarchy in
which first and second person are equally ranked. This should result in a lan-
guage that allows resolution of clashes between third person and either first or
second person, but not resolution of clashes between first and second person. An
example of such a language is Kaqchikel, as discussed in Preminger (2014) (all
Kaqchikel data below are taken from this source). In ordinary transitive clauses,
the verb agrees with both subject and object, and this configuration of multiple
agreement is reflected in two distinct agreement morphemes:
(46) Kaqchikel
a. rat
you.sg
x-∅-aw-ax-aj
com-3sg.abs-2sg.erg-hear-act
ri
the
achin.
man
‘You heard the man.’
b. ri
the
achin
man
x-a-r-ax-aj
com-2sg.abs-3sg.erg-hear-act
rat.
you.sg
‘The man heard you.’
The interesting twist in Kaqchikel is that there is a construction, known as the
Agent Focus construction, in which the number of agreement slots on the verb
is reduced to one. This, of course, creates a situation in which person clashes
arise. When one of the arguments of the verb is third person and the other one
is not, the clash is resolved in favour of the non-third person argument. This is
illustrated in (47) for a combination of a first person and third person argument,
and in (48) for a combination of a second person and third person argument.
(47) a. ja
foc
yïn
me
x-in
com-1sg
/
/
*∅-ax-an
*3sg.abs-hear-af
ri
the
achin.
man
‘It was me that heard the man.’
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b. ja
foc
ri
the
achin
man
x-in
com-1sg
/
/
*∅-ax-an
*3sg.abs-hear-af
yïn.
me
‘It was the man that heard me.’
(48) a. ja
foc
rat
you.sg
x-at
com-2sg
/
/
*∅-ax-an
*3sg.abs-hear-af
ri
the
achin.
man
‘It was you that heard the man.’
b. ja
foc
ri
the
achin
man
x-at
com-2sg
/
/
*∅-ax-an
*3sg.abs-hear-af
rat.
you.sg
‘It was the man that heard you.’
This indicates that there is a person hierarchy in Kaqchikel on which both first
and second person outrank third person.10 That first and second person are not
ranked with respect to each other on this hierarchy is shown by the fact that, in
the Agent Focus construction, no resolution is possible in case both arguments
are local. As in Icelandic and elsewhere, unresolved clashes result in ungrammat-
icality. Thus, the following are impossible, regardless of the choice of agreement
on the verb, whether first person, second person, or (default) third person.
(49) a. * ja
foc
rat
you.sg
x-in
com-1sg
/
/
at
2sg
/
/
∅-ax-an
3sg.abs-hear-af
yïn.
me
Intended: ‘It was you that heard me.’
b. * ja
foc
yïn
me
x-in
com-1sg
/
/
at
2sg
/
/
∅-ax-an
3sg.abs-hear-af
rat.
you.sg
Intended: ‘It was me that heard you.’
Preminger (2014) argues that it is undesirable to appeal to person hierarchies
to deal with the Kaqchikel data. He proposes a syntactic account which he claims
10When both arguments in the Agent Focus construction are third person, the result is third
person agreement. If one of the third person arguments is plural and the other singular, we
get plural agreement (omnivorous number). This indicates that, as expected, when unification
is possible, this is used as the strategy for determining the spell-out of a single agreement slot
for two feature bundles. When one of the arguments is first or second person and the other
argument is third person, the first or second person argument will be agreed with not only for
person but also for number (no omnivorous number in this case; see Preminger 2014: 20). This
shows that ‘partial unification’ is impossible (either there is unification for all 𝜑-features, or
no unification at all) and that, when unification fails, the person hierarchy determines which
argument’s features are realized. This is a property of unification in general: if there is a clash
in any feature, it fails.
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to be motivated independently, and which derives the effects of the person hier-
archy. The account is based on a Probe-Goal system of syntactic agreement regu-
lated by relativized minimality. In the Kaqchikel Agent Focus construction, there
is one functional head that acts as a Probe for person features. This head specif-
ically probes for a participant feature. Given relativized minimality, the highest
DP that has a participant feature will act as the Goal. However, Preminger as-
sumes, following Béjar & Rezac (2003), that all first or second person features in
DPs must be licensed by entering an agreement relation:11
(50) Person Licensing Condition (Béjar & Rezac 2003)
Interpretable 1st/2nd person features must be licensed by entering into an
Agree relation with an appropriate functional category.
The consequence of this is that the lower DP in the Agent Focus construction
cannot be licensed if it, too, is first or second person. In contrast, if the subject is
third person, this is skipped in the Probe’s search for a participant feature, and
agreement will be with the first or second person object.
Whether or not an account that appeals to a person hierarchy is more stip-
ulative than this syntactic account can only be evaluated properly when cross-
linguistic variation in the effects of person hierarchies is considered. After all, we
have seen that it is certainly not always the case that a clash between first and
second person results in ungrammaticality. In some languages, these clashes are
resolved as well, sometimes in favour of first person and sometimes in favour of
second person (see above). It seems to us that the only way in which the syntactic
account just outlined can deal with such variation is by specifying the features
that the Probe is searching for. However, the language variation implies that it
is not sufficient to specify a fixed feature content for the Probe per language.
Probes must be allowed to search for different features, and in addition the fea-
tures searched for must be ordered such that agreement with some is preferred
over agreement with others.
11Béjar & Rezac (2003) invoke this condition in an account of the so-called Person Case Con-
straint (PCC). This is a constraint on the possible features of an accusative clitic or weak pro-
noun in the presence of a dative clitic or weak pronoun. There is language variation in what
is prohibited, but a common form of the constraint is that the accusative pronominal cannot
be first or second person in the context of any dative pronominal. We think that PCC effects
should not be linked to agreement, however, simply because in most of the languages that
show PCC effects, neither dative nor accusative objects agree with the verb. At the least, this
shows that the Agree operation invoked in (50) cannot be equated with actual agreement, but
it is the latter in which we are interested here. For accounts of the PCC that are not based on
Agree, see Haspelmath (2004); Runić (2013); Kiss (2015), among others.
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Consider a language with a 2 > 1 > 3 hierarchy, for instance. Given that second
person defeats first person in a clash, the verbal head must probe specifically for
a feature that is unique to second person, say addressee. Otherwise, it should
not be able to skip a first person argument in its search. However, if the Probe is
specified as addressee also in a context where there is a clash between a first per-
son and a third person argument, the situation would be unresolvable. In order
to explain why the third person is ignored in favour of the first person argu-
ment, the feature content of the Probe must be different. In particular, the Probe
must search for a feature that distinguishes first and third person, that is, either a
speaker feature or amore general participant feature. But in the 1 vs 2 situation,
the Probe cannot be permitted to search for either of these features. The impli-
cation is that there is a hierarchy that determines which features are preferably
selected as the specification of the Probe. Clearly, this is simply the counterpart
of the 2 > 1 > 3 person hierarchy. Given the attested language variation, it must
be the case that this hierarchy of preferred feature content for the Probe can vary
from language to language. We conclude that there is no difference between the
syntactic account and the morphological account proposed here in terms of the
necessity of stipulating a language-particular feature hierarchy.12
The main objection to the syntactic alternative, however, is that it fails to
account for those situations in which third person DPs are involved in person
clashes. As we have seen in the previous sections, the agreement data from Ice-
landic quirky subject constructions and Dutch clefts can be understood as the
12Preminger argues that the syntactic account, but not an account based on a person hierarchy
directly, provides insight into the morphology of the agreement markers in Kaqchikel. In par-
ticular, first and second person agreement markers are reduced versions of strong pronouns,
while third person agreement markers are not. Moreover, the third person marker is a num-
ber marker; third person singular is null. Preminger’s account for this is that probing by the
person head results in clitic doubling of the Goal, while probing by the number head does
not. Since the person head does not probe a third person DP, we get only number agreement
when a third person DP agrees, and therefore not a clitic. (This holds both in the Agent Focus
construction and in ordinary transitive clauses, so is not related to the occurrence of a person
clash.) Of course, the generalisation that agreement with first and second person takes the
form of a clitic can be made in any theory that can generalise over first and second person. In
our account, one could say that agreement for prox takes the form of a clitic. Neither of these
accounts provides insight for why this should be so. It is a well-known observation that in a
number of languages the morphology of first and second person agreement markers diachron-
ically developed from pronouns, while the morphology of third person agreement markers did
not (see Fuß 2005 and references mentioned there). This may not have anything to do with the
internal logic of the person feature system, but rather with the high accessibility in discourse
of first and second person, which Ariel (2000) argues favours reduction of the pronominal
markers expressing these persons to clitics and subsequently to agreement markers.
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result of just such a clash. If the person clash in the Kaqchikel Agent Focus con-
struction is the result of the Person Licensing Condition in (50), third persons
should never lead to a similar problem. At the least, then, this implies that a uni-
fied account of all the data discussed in this paper is not possible on a syntactic
account based on this particular constellation of assumptions.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that there is a fundamental distinction between de-
fault person and default number. Third person has a feature specification, while
singular number does not. The argument is based on configurations in which
two 𝜑-feature bundles compete for spell-out. In the case of number, this never
results in a clash. Instead, there will be omnivorous number: the verb shows plu-
ral agreement whenever at least one of the feature bundles is specified as plural.
In contrast, in the case of person this situation can lead to a clash. This accounts
for the impossibility of having a lower nominative with a different person specifi-
cation than the subject in both Icelandic quirky subject constructions and Dutch
clefts. Those cases where a verb does show omnivorous person agreement are
the result of language-specific person hierarchies used for resolution. We have
presented an account of such hierarchies that is in line with the assumption that
third person is not feature-less.
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